The concept of emergence has seen a significant resurgence in philosophy and the sciences yet debates regarding emergentist and reductionist visions of the natural world continue to be hampered by imprecision or ambiguity. Emergent phenomena are said to arise out of and be sustained by more basic phenomena while at the same time exerting a top-down control upon those very sustaining processes. To some critics this has the air of magic as it seems to suggest a kind of circular causality. Other critics deem the concept of emergence to be objectionably anti-naturalistic. Objections such as these have led many thinkers to construe emergent phenomena instead as coarse-grained patterns in the world that while calling for distinctive concepts do not disrupt the ordinary dynamics of the finer-grained (more fundamental) levels. Yet reconciling emergence with a (presumed) pervasive causal continuity at the fundamental level can seem to deflate emergence of its initially profound significance. This basic problematic is mirrored by similar controversy over how best to characterize the opposite systematizing impulse most commonly given an equally evocative but vague term reductionism. The original essays in this volume help to clarify the alternatives: inadequacies in some older formulations and arguments are exposed and new lines of argument on behalf the two visions are advanced. . Language: English